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INTRODUCTION
How is the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit doing
after over fifteen years, and what does its future hold?
As the first and only departure from federal appellate courts with
general jurisdiction, Congress’s creation in 1982 of the Federal
Circuit as a subject matter court was clearly an experiment.1 The
jurisdiction of general courts is geographical and comprehensive,
while the jurisdiction of subject matter courts, such as the Federal
Circuit, is specified and limited.2 The initial question, then, is: Did
this experiment in limited specialization succeed? After more than a
fifteen years, most scholars and practitioners would answer the
question in the affirmative.3 Judges on the court and others familiar
with its work from inside the institution would also agree. The
question remains: Is the experiment over?
I.

A RETROSPECTIVE VIEW

A. Increased Jurisdiction and Caseload
It may be too soon to tell whether this experiment of specific
subject matter jurisdiction is over. Federal jurisdiction for all courts
continues to develop and change. Congress has expanded the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit several times. The most notable
expansion occurred in 1987 with the addition of jurisdiction over
cases arising from the statutory “no fault” compensation program for
childhood vaccine injuries.4 During approximately the same period,
1. See Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25.
2. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (1994) (limiting the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit to appeals of decisions by specialized bodies or appeals concerning specific
statutes in the areas of patent, trade, takings, and contracts).
3. See, e.g., William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New
Certiorari: Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 319-20 (1996)
(explaining that the advantages of subject matter courts, such as the Federal Circuit, are
expertise, efficiency due to the judges’ familiarity with the subject matter, and consistency in
judicial opinions); Helen Wilson Nies, State of the Court, Address Before The Eleventh Annual
Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (June 18,
1993), in 153 F.R.D. 177, 185 (1993) (maintaining that the work of the Federal Circuit is
favorable, with few negatives). But see, e.g., J. Harvie Wilkinson III, The Drawbacks of Growth in the
Federal Judiciary, 43 EMORY L.J. 1147, 1185-86 (1994) (examining the quick arousal of
controversy when suggestions to increase the number and type of specialized subject matter
courts are made).
4. See H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 100-495, at 771-72 (1987), reprinted in 1987 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1245,
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Congress created the United States Court of Veterans Appeals5 and
made that court’s decisions subject to limited review by the Federal
Circuit.6 In the first half of the 1990s, Congress increased the
jurisdiction of the Federal Circuit a third and fourth time by giving
the court “follow-on” jurisdiction to that of the Temporary
Emergency Court of Appeals (“TECA”).7 Federal Circuit jurisdiction
over certain discrimination claims arising from the Senate, the White
House, and other special entities of the U.S. government soon
followed.8
Fortunately, for a court whose pre-existing jurisdiction yielded a
modest increase in the number of cases during most of the years of its
existence, cases in the four new areas of jurisdiction, after some initial
growth, leveled off and then ultimately declined.9 This decrease in
caseload was due to the court’s strict interpretation of its subject
matter jurisdiction.10
Veterans’ appeals have diminished presumably because pro bono
lawyers representing veterans and counsel from the veterans’
organizations recognize the strict limits on the scope of subject
matter review. Under the statute,11 the Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit may not review fact-findings or application of the law
to the facts in a case involving denial of veterans’ benefits.12 Rather,
subject matter jurisdiction is limited to assessing:
(1) the
constitutionality of statutes or regulations relied upon, (2) the validity
1517-18 (amending the Vaccine Injury Compensation Act of 1986 by assigning jurisdiction over
vaccine injury claims to the U.S. Claims Court, decisions of which are reviewable by the Federal
Circuit).
5. Recently, the court was renamed the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans
Claims. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-47, at 3 (1997).
6. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 30 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5782, 5812
(stating that the Federal Circuit may not review a challenge to a factual determination or a
challenge to a law or regulation as to a particular case).
7. See Federal Courts Administration Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-572, § 102, 106 Stat.
4506, 4506-07 (abolishing the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and transferring its
jurisdiction over appeals under the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379,
§ 211, 84 Stat. 799, and judicial review of emergency orders under the Natural Gas Policy Act of
1978, 15 U.S.C. § 3416(c) (1994), to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
8. See Government Employee Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1088
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1201, 1209 (1994)) (providing that Senate and other
government employees are to be free of discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, age, or disability, and that enforcement authority is vested in the Senate
Committee on Ethics with judicial review in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
9. Indeed, the petroleum price regulation cases from TECA have now virtually ceased.
10. For example, in reviewing veterans’ claims, the jurisdiction-granting statute prohibits
the review of factual findings or the application of law to the facts of the case. See 38 U.S.C.
§ 7292(d)(2) (1994). Consequently, the court interprets this prohibition to limit its jurisdiction
to interpretations in the abstract of relevant statutes and regulations that are relied upon by the
Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims in reaching its decisions.
11. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (1994).
12. See H.R. REP. NO. 100-963, at 69 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4105, 4121.
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of those statutes or regulations, and (3) their interpretation.13
Indeed, the application of law to particular facts is excluded expressly
from the court’s jurisdiction.14
Judicial review of childhood vaccine compensation cases involves a
highly deferential standard of review, although unlike the veterans’
benefit appeals, the review of factual findings and the application of
law to facts is not precluded completely.15 In vaccine cases, however,
the statute requires the court to defer, at the level of substantial
evidence, to determinations by the Special Master after
determinations were reviewed or re-adjudicated by a judge of the
Court of Federal Claims under the same standard.16 Essentially, this
mandate means that if there is more than minimal evidence to
support the findings and conclusions of the Special Master, then the
reviewing judge of the Court of Federal Claims and the panel of the
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit must uphold the Special
Master’s decision.17
Meanwhile, in addition to a modest, yet steady, increase in caseload
during most of the Federal Circuit’s years of operation, the
composition of that caseload has shifted significantly in recent years.
This shift has produced a sharp decrease in the number of personnel
cases from the Merit Systems Protection Board, and an increase in
the number of patent infringement cases from the district courts.18 In
the 1980s, the personnel cases comprised about one-third of the
court’s total caseload and outnumbered the patent cases by a
considerable margin. In the early 1990s, the Federal Circuit had
approximately 900 cases pending, 350 of which were personnel cases
13. See id. at 68-69, reprinted in 1998 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4105, 4120-21 (stating that the Federal
Circuit has exclusive jurisdiction to review and to decide any challenge to the validity of any
statute or regulation or any interpretation by the U.S. Court of Veterans Appeals and to
interpret constitutional and statutory provisions).
14. See id. at 69, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4105, 4121 (stating that the Federal Circuit
does not have jurisdiction to review the application of any law or regulation to particular factual
determinations).
15. See Public Health Service Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12(e)(2)(B) (1994) (stating that under
the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, questions of law are not
reviewed de novo, rather, deference is given to the Special Master’s expertise).
16. See Hodges v. Secretary of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 9 F.3d 958, 961 (Fed.
Cir. 1993) (stating that under 42 U.S.C. § 300aa-12, Congress assigned the job of sorting
through cases and judging the merits of individual claims to the Special Master, and that on
review, the Court of Federal Claims is not to second-guess the Special Master’s fact-intensive
conclusions).
17. See, e.g., Jordan v. Secretary of the Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 38 Fed. Cl. 148,
150 (1997) (stating that under the National Vaccine Compensation Program, the Court of
Federal Claims cannot overturn factual findings of the Special Master unless the petitioner
proves that the result is “arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion”).
18. A decade ago we typically had pending nearly 400 MSPB cases and less than 250 patent
infringement cases from the district courts. By 1999 those numbers had reversed. Thus, on
September 3, 1999, the court had pending 277 MSPB cases and 380 district court patent cases.
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and perhaps 200 to 250 of which were patent infringement cases. By
1998, these statistics reversed, and the Federal Circuit now has 374
patent infringement cases and only approximately 222 personnel
cases. As the former are far more complicated than the latter and
usually involve a large number of difficult issues, very complicated
facts, and often arise from lengthy trials, each additional patent case
adds a significant amount of work. By contrast, the vast majority of
personnel cases involve only one or two issues that are often simple,
and generally require only short evidentiary hearings of a day or so.
Because of these differences, each patent infringement case takes
perhaps ten times the work of the personnel case it replaced.
Thus, in addition to the numerical increase in the total number of
filings and in the total number of cases pending at any given time,
there has been a steady increase in the difficulty of the average case,
as well as the amount of time required for appellate review.
Accordingly, the total workload of the Federal Circuit is significantly
larger now than in its first full year of operation in 1983.
Despite this increasing burden, however, the complement of
judges has not changed. Congress originally authorized twelve
judges, but generally ten or eleven actually sit on the court. At the
turn of the decade, the number of judges dropped briefly to as low as
eight. In 1998, the court had eleven judges throughout the calendar
year.
In my view, the court is operating at close to its capacity. Thus, I
fear that even slight increases in caseload could threaten to erode
expedition of cases and perhaps the quality of decisions, or at least
the articulation of the rationales.
B. Increased Visibility of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
Another change that occurred during the court’s existence eludes
measurement by numbers. One might say that the Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit has finally, or increasingly, been “discovered.”
For example, the court is now much more widely known and
recognized among practitioners in areas other than those within the
jurisdiction of the court. The court is also much better known
among legal commentators, law school professors, and legal
journalists. The Legal Times, for example, covers the court’s work
more extensively now than five years ago, when the court was almost
never mentioned.19 A recent edition of Corporate Counsel magazine
19. See, e.g., Rebecca M. McNeill, Hey Circuit, Listen to Your PTO, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 16,
1999, at 31 (arguing that the Federal Circuit has “been able to shape the contours of patent law
as interpreted by federal judges and by the PTO itself”).
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featured an article discussing the court. As a result of the court’s
increased exposure, the number and quality of law clerk applications
has increased steadily. Top students from the most prestigious law
schools in the country, many of whom formerly applied only to the
regional circuits, are now applying for clerkships at the Federal
Circuit.
Despite these indications of success, Congress has not created
another court modeled after the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, with national jurisdiction but subject matter jurisdiction
limited to specific areas. Although the above-mentioned incremental
increases in the court’s jurisdiction could be interpreted as a vote of
confidence, it cannot be coincidental that Congress has declined to
create a second such court, particularly in light of ongoing discussion
about the advisability of doing so.
C. Recent Debate on Increasing the Federal Circuit’s Jurisdiction
In 1998, a statutory commission, chaired by retired U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Byron R. White, reported to Congress its findings with
respect to the structure and operation of the federal appellate
system.20 One of the issues that the White Commission analyzed
carefully was whether to create additional courts with subject matter
jurisdiction.21 The clear position of the Commission was that this was
not advisable.22 Moreover, although the Commission referred briefly
to academic commentaries that suggested significant increases in
Federal Circuit intellectual property jurisdiction, the Commission
declined to recommend any such increases. Instead, the Commission
dealt solely with tax and social security benefit appeals. In a public
draft of its report, the Commission also included a brief section
discussing the possibility of transferring copyright cases from the
regional circuits to the Federal Circuit. This subsection, however, was
deleted from the final version of the report submitted to Congress.
Although the White Commission did not recommend increases in the
Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction, it did not recommend decreases.
On the other side of the coin, commentary from within the ranks
of federal appellate and trial judges over recent years often has been
critical of the Federal Circuit, as well as any trial or appellate court of
specialized subject matter jurisdiction. From time to time, leading
20. COMMISSION ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL,
FINAL REPORT (1998) (visited Nov. 8, 1999) <http://app.comm.uscourts.gov/final/appstruc.
Pdf> [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
21. See id. at 67.
22. See id. at 73.
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judges have suggested that the patent infringement jurisdiction of the
Federal Circuit be returned to the regional circuits. Nevertheless,
when the Federal Court Study Committee and the Long Range
Planning Committee of the United States Judicial Conference
submitted their final recommendations, the committees did not
recommend that the Federal Circuit be abolished or even that patent
jurisdiction be restored to the regional circuits, despite strong
advocacy from some.23 For example, the former Chief Judge of the
Ninth Circuit and the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit expressed
doubts. In sum, after much analysis and debate in this decade, the
court has neither received large grants of additional jurisdiction nor
encountered serious efforts to strip it of its present jurisdiction. The
opposing forces reached an early equilibrium and thereafter, have
remained essentially in that balance.
I expect the consensus among judges, legislators, and the
commentators who write on this topic to remain the same. That is,
that the Federal Circuit should continue to exist with something very
close to its present jurisdiction, but that large additional areas of
jurisdiction (such as copyright, trademark, tax, or social security)
should not be given to it. With regard to the possible creation of a
second, semi-specialized court of appeals, the present consensus is
that this should await further developments.24 For example, although
logical arguments could be made for the benefit of national
uniformity in administration of the tax laws that would come from
centralizing the appeal of tax cases, few people seem to think that the
problem is so serious in its practical impact that major reforms are
needed.25 Indeed, the tax bar has been and remains opposed.26

23. See Report on the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States, reprinted
in UNITED STATES COURTS: SELECTED REPORTS 51 (1993) (adopting recommendations made by
the Long Range Planning Committee by reaffirming the “historical commitment to the
principle that the jurisdiction of the federal courts should be limited, complementing, and not
supplanting the jurisdiction of state courts”). The Committee on Long Range Planning did not
mention amending the categories of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction. See id., reprinted in
UNITED STATES COURTS: SELECTED REPORTS 51-52 (1993).
24. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20, at 73-74 (making no specific recommendation
regarding the categories of the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction).
25. See James P. Holden, The Federal Courts Study Committee Has Not Made the Case For Its
Proposed Overhaul of the Tax Litigation Process, 40 CATH. U. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1991) (noting
that the existing system for litigating federal tax issues “works well”). But see Erwin Griswold,
Cutting the Cloak to Fit the Cloth: An Approach to Problems in the Federal Courts, 32 CATH. U. L. REV.
787, 806-07 (1983) (proposing reform by creating a separate “Court of Tax Appeals”).
26. See Holden, supra note 25, at 644 (advocating that adjustments can be made to the
present tax litigation system without resorting to the “dramatic surgery” that the federal Courts
Study Commission has proposed).
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II. THE FUTURE DEBATE AND OUR FUTURE ROLE
I believe that the experiment will be ongoing. New business
arrangements and world-wide markets are rapidly changing the
nature of all commercial law and litigation, and are spurring the
creation of vast new fields of greater complexity, practically unknown
in prior eras.
These forces will exert great pressure on all courts that handle
commercial cases—essentially the core jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit—to become more specialized in order to match the explosion
of specialization in law practice and business. Therefore, in my view,
the recent struggle within groups such as the White Commission or
the Judicial Conference Long Range Planning Committee was more
like a wave on the surface of the sea, while the forces of business and
science, not visible on the surface, will be as strong as the current.
The latter likely will prove more powerful in the long run. I,
therefore, predict that suggestions for a second specialized court of
appeals to handle tax, social security, and other benefit entitlement
cases, and additional jurisdiction in the intellectual property field for
the Federal Circuit, will reoccur. Coming more from business leaders
than the legal community, these suggestions will be expressed more
powerfully and will be supported more widely each time they are
raised. Ultimately, members of Congress may respond to such
“corporate” demands, particularly those of mid-size and large
corporations, more than the urgings of the American Bar Association
or similar groups.
Another source of pressure toward greater specialization of the
U.S. appellate court system is likely to be other countries. In many of
these systems, particularly the German system, there is considerable
specialization at virtually all levels of adjudication, including the
appellate level. Moreover, the strong tradition in the United States to
avoid trial courts of specialized jurisdiction actually may serve to
increase the pressure for greater specialization at the federal
appellate level.
The third force pushing toward greater specialization and
increased jurisdiction for the Federal Circuit will come from the very
power of science and technology itself. As the new century begins, it
seems obvious, even to those less informed about high technology,
that emerging bio-tech, computer, and telecommunications
technologies radically will alter all commercial arrangements and
their economic effects in a very short span of time. Therefore, it
seems likely that society at large, not to mention the business
community, will be less tolerant of any inconsistent or possibly
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unsound adjudications by general adjudicators handling highly
complicated matters of great economic importance with widespread
practical consequences. Attention to the Y2K dilemma illustrates this
phenomenon. Recently, a scholar suggested that all cases arising
from this problem be tried in special temporary courts with appellate
review by the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit, I think, will survive with at least its current
areas of jurisdiction intact. Even without a formal change in
jurisdiction, the court will become increasingly important to the
national economy and the fortunes of nearly all U.S. corporations,
including smaller, privately owned and start-up corporations. In this
sense, the Federal Circuit ultimately may be characterized not so
much as a science and technology court, but as a business court, or
the “corporation” court.
If this prediction is accurate, it will have an important effect with
respect to the recruitment of judges for the court. While thus far the
patent bar has been the main source of suggestions concerning the
appointment of judges, recent appointments indicate that this may
well change. With the possible exception of the most recent
appointment, none of the five most recent appointments—all in 1990
or later—came from the patent bar or were proposed by patent bar
organizations. At present, two of the ten judges on the Federal
Circuit have considerable pre-appointment backgrounds as patent
lawyers. Both of these judges hailed from long service in major
technological corporations where each served as the lead patent
lawyer. In earlier times, the court had a larger number of intellectual
property lawyers.27 Despite these pressures, only one of the nine
judges appointed since 1985 came from the patent bar. Most of the
Federal Circuit appointees have come from general litigation or
government service backgrounds. With the growing importance of
public contract and international trade cases, perhaps these two bars
will become active in the recruitment and nomination process. In
addition, I expect that there will be increasing pressure from the
general counsels of America’s leading corporations rather than, as at
present, just from the chief patent lawyers. All of these forces could
have positive effects on the court, such as added congressional
attention and support.

27. Indeed, at one point in 1989, five of the eight members were from the intellectual
property bar, with four from the patent bar, and the late Judge Helen Nies from the trademark
bar.
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III. THE STATE OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT AT PRESENT
A. Our Inner Workings
A number of basic observations can be made about the state of the
court and its health as an institution at the present time. First, the
court seems to be operating in an increasingly well-organized and
efficient manner, particularly under various innovations instituted by
our new Chief Judge and new Circuit Executive.28 The court has
upgraded its internal computer systems several times. The clerk’s
office has instituted an electronic bulletin board. Because of our
better technology, the court submits decided cases to legal publishers
in disk form. With respect to workload, the addition in the early
1990s of a third law clerk for each of our court’s judges in regular
active service has assisted the court in meeting the increase in
complexity and volume of cases, as well as maintaining an enviable, if
imperfect, record of expedition.
Assessing the court’s work from the standpoint of speed, however,
requires deciding what standard of measure one should apply. The
court’s average elapsed time between filing and decision or between
argument and the issuance of an opinion is as good as, or better
than, all other circuit courts of appeals except for one or two.29
Certain typical measures of judicial efficiency make us look quite
good. For example, the vast majority of the court’s opinions issue
within ninety days of the oral argument. The relatively large number
of simple personnel cases, however, may skew some of these figures.30
For example, in patent cases, it is not uncommon for the disposition
to take a year or more following the filing of the appeal, and as much
as six to eight months after oral argument. The same can be said for
other complicated cases, usually with large money stakes, such as
major government contracts, takings, and international trade cases.
Like its sister circuits, the Federal Circuit uses a variety of efficiency
measures to cope with a substantial caseload. First, the court disposes
of almost a third of its cases by summary affirmance (i.e., without
opinion) under Federal Circuit Rule 36. Second, the court disposes
of another one-third of its cases under its Rule 47.6 by “nonprecedential” decision (i.e., a public opinion explaining the
28. Chief Judge Mayor assumed his position in December, 1997. Our Circuit Executive,
Jan Hurbaly, took office by appointment of the Chief Judge in 1996.
29. See U.S. SENATE JUDICIARY SUBCOMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT AND THE
COURTS, CHAIRMAN’S REPORT ON THE APPROPRIATE ALLOCATION OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED
STATES COURT OF APPEALS § II(l) (Mar. 1999) (Sen. Grassley, Chair).
30. See id. (charting the large number of personnel filings in the Federal Circuit).
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reasoning of the court but usually only in abbreviated form). These
opinions, however, cannot be cited as precedent. It is unclear how
the court could make greater use of either of these labor-saving
devices. Indeed, their use is often criticized, although sometimes
because of misunderstanding. For example, members of the specialty
bars complain informally at conferences. Some speculate that the
court uses non-precedential opinions in difficult cases. Actually, the
court follows the Federal Circuit rule’s standard, which reserves
precedential treatment to decisions that “add significantly to the body
of precedent.”31 Further, the court follows a presumption in favor of
precedential treatment and the vote of only one member of the panel
requires it. Nevertheless, the court’s use of each device comports
with that of its sister circuits.
B. Summary Judgment
The operation of the court and the state of its jurisprudence,
however, cannot be understood without examining the nature of the
appeals it decides. Here, the great distinction is between cases tried
below and those decided on summary judgment.
Summary
judgments currently make up a large portion of our caseload. This is
so in nearly all of the court’s major areas of jurisdiction. For
example, in the many types of cases appealed to the court from the
decisions of the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, I believe the majority
involve summary judgment. Of course, its jurisdiction is limited to
various types of money claims against the United States, for example,
in public contract cases. This Essay will illustrate, however, how the
use of summary judgment is increasing and will focus on the impact
that summary judgment has had in patent cases. In these situations,
the effects of summary judgment can be significant.
The role of summary judgment motions in modern patent cases is
difficult to overestimate. Recent changes in claim construction
methodology have increased the number of issues and, indeed, the
number of cases amenable to final disposition on summary
judgment.32 For example, once the asserted claims of a patent have
been construed fully as to any disputed terms, the existence of literal

31. FED. CIR. R. 47.6(b) (detailing Federal Circuit procedure for determining precedential
value of opinions).
32. It is now clear, for example, that patent claim construction is for the court, not the
jury. This determination is to be based primarily on the patent itself, that is, the claims, the
accompanying “written description,” and where relevant and proffered, the record of the
examination process, referred to as “prosecution history.” The prosecution history includes
communications between the examiner and the applicant’s attorney.
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infringement33 can frequently be determined as a matter of law
because the structure and operation of the accused device are rarely
subject to genuine evidentiary dispute.
Similarly, proper
construction of the scope of asserted claims will sometimes settle the
issue of equivalent infringement as a matter of law because no
reasonable jury could find that the substituted step or element is
found equivalently in the accused process or device.34 In addition,
many issues of patent validity, such as invalidity for obviousness,
likewise can be determined on summary judgment.
Not
uncommonly, the scope and content of the prior art, the differences
between the prior art, and the claimed invention and the level of skill
in the art are not subject to genuine dispute, if any dispute at all. In
many cases, so-called objective considerations of non-obviousness are
either unproven or of relatively little weight in the overall analysis of
obviousness or non-obviousness. In such cases, the determination of
whether the claimed invention would have been obvious at the time,
in view of the prior art, resolves into a legal inquiry of the undisputed
facts according to the general conditions set forth in Graham v. John
Deere Co.35 by the Supreme Court in 1966. Similarly, alleged invalidity
on other grounds, such as failure to disclose the best mode,
indefiniteness of the asserted claims, and certain other common
affirmative defenses also can be resolved frequently as a matter of law
on summary judgment.
It is now clear that claim construction and all preliminary
determinations relating to claim construction are for the court alone
and involve solely questions of law.36 Hence, whenever claim
construction resolves the issue of equivalent and/or literal
infringement, summary judgment or partial summary judgment will
be available. Theoretically, the only cases in need of trial would be
33. A finding of literal infringement requires that the relevant structure in the implicated
device perform the identical function to the one recited in the claim and be identical or
equivalent to the corresponding structure as defined in the specifications. See Mas-Hamilton
Group v. LaGard, Inc., 156 F.3d 1206, 1211, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1010, 1014 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
34. Equivalent infringement “may be found when an accused device performs substantially
the same overall function or work, in substantially the same way, to obtain substantially the same
overall result as the claimed invention.” Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 940,
934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737, 1744 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (noting that the doctrine will not extend
(1) to cover an accused device in the prior art, and (2) to allow the patentee to recapture
through equivalence certain coverage given up during prosecution) (emphasis added).
35. 383 U.S. 1 (1966). In this case, the Court affirmed three conditions to offer uniformity
in assessing the validity of a patent: (1) whether the scope and content of a prior art are being
infringed, (2) whether differences between the prior art and the art at issue are ascertained,
and (3) a determination of the level of ordinary skill necessary in the pertinent art. See id. at 17.
36. See Markman v. Westviews Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 389-90 (1996) (determining
that a judge is in a better position to construe claims than a lay jury because the judge has more
experience in evaluating expert testimony regarding patent structure).
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those in which either the structure and operation of the accused
device are unclear based on the summary judgment affidavits or
depositions, or where there is a close question about whether the
terms of the claim are met by the features of the accused device or
steps in the accused process, literally or equivalently.
I predict that an increasing portion of patent infringement cases
will be resolved on summary judgment. It is conceivable, for
example, that in as many as one-quarter of the cases, literal
infringement could be decided as a matter of law. In another
quarter, perhaps, equivalent infringement could be decided as a
matter of law. In yet another quarter, both forms of infringement
could be eliminated as legally incorrect. As a result, only one-fourth
of infringement cases would require trial on both types of
infringement, while another fourth would require no trial at all.
One reason why equivalent infringement might be eliminated in
one-quarter, or perhaps up to one-half of the cases, is that
prosecution history estoppel, like claim construction, has been
designated as a question of law for the court, not the jury.37 In
addition, now that the “limitation-by-limitation” or “element-byelement” requirement of Pennwalt v. Durand-Wayland, Inc.38 has been
upheld for establishing equivalent infringement specifically, and
perhaps even strengthened by the Supreme Court in Warner-Jenkinson
Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,39 equivalent infringement, even when
not involving prosecution history estoppel, is often amenable to
summary judgment.
As summary judgment law in patent cases continues to evolve,
ultimately one-half of the cases may be decided in this manner,
without trial on any issue. Summary judgment is particularly
important in patent cases because of the proliferation of complicated
issues, both of infringement and validity, as well as collateral issues
such as patent misuse, inequitable conduct, and antitrust violations.40
Summary judgment, or even partial summary judgment, has
important collateral advantages that may not be widely recognized.
37. Prosecution history estoppel provides that “a surrender of subject matter during patent
prosecution may preclude recapturing any part of that subject matter, even if it is equivalent to
the matter expressly claimed.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17,
18-19 (1997).
38. 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
39. Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29 (holding, in a unanimous decision, that the doctrine of
equivalents mandates its application to each similar element of a patent claim).
40. See, e.g., Markman, 517 U.S. at 373 (discussing patent law suits and infringement in
terms of making, using, and selling patent inventions without authority); Cardinal Chem. Co. v.
Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 90 (1993) (explaining the relationship between patent validity
and infringement within the context of vacating declaratory judgment).
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For example, settling certain issues as a matter of law, thus removing
them from ensuing trial, may change the calculus of the parties as to
possible settlement because of the issues that remain. As a result, the
prospects for one side may be dim, and settlement may become more
likely. Furthermore, even for issues that survive summary judgment
and are destined for trial, the very exposition of the issues in light of
the prospective trial evidence of the two sides may change the
calculation that each side made previously of its chances of
prevailing. This process promotes settlement without trial even
where one or more issues have been set for trial after unsuccessful
attempts to resolve them on summary judgment.
A very similar situation is seen in government contracts, takings,
international trade, and other cases. The use of summary judgment
saves untold time and expense for the litigants and the trial court.
Summary judgment has become more frequent and will continue on
the same upward slope.
What are the implications of summary judgment for the court of
appeals? Appeals from summary judgment are labor intensive for the
Federal Circuit. The court must dig deeply into the affidavits and
depositions in a way seldom required after trial. Thus, the increased
use of summary judgment means more work and the use of more
resources at the appellate level.
C. Additional Judges or Clerks
Realistically, I doubt that Congress will increase the court’s budget
and authorize a fourth law clerk per judge. Indeed, I do not believe
such an increased number of law clerks is desirable. On balance, the
increased burden of managing a fourth clerk might exceed the
judge’s production. Nor will the size of the court’s small central staff
of attorneys likely grow.
Similarly, it is unlikely that the complement of authorized, active
judges on the court, which now stands at twelve, will ever be
increased. The total number of cases decided per year by the court is
already considerably less than other circuits.41 Therefore, if the delay
in the disposition time of appeals is to improve, it will have to be as a
result of more self-policing by members of the court, rather than
through an increase in resources or a change in rules of practice and
procedures.
41. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE
UNITED STATES COURTS 91-94, 131 (1998) (describing in table form that in 1998, the Federal
Circuit terminated 1,386 cases, while other circuit courts terminated between 1,590 (D.C.
Circuit) and 8,425 (9th Circuit) cases).

1999]

FOREWORD

1191

D. Unpredictability of the Outcome and Its Effect on the Pursuit of Litigation
The problem most frequently mentioned by practitioners is known
as “panel-dependency.” Panel dependency is the belief that the result
in a case is a function of the membership of the three-judge panel.
In response, I note that panels are assembled by a random computer
process. I emphasize that a representative set of cases is assigned
blindly to the panel as well. Moreover, none of the judges specialize
in any particular technology or even in any particular type of case.
Nevertheless, practitioners, particularly in the patent field, often
maintain that the outcome, as well as the rationale of court decisions,
are strongly reflective of the identity of the three judges.
I believe that these complaints are exaggerated. By informal
monitoring, I estimate that in ninety percent of the cases the result
would be the same with any combination of three judges from among
the court’s present complement of ten judges in full-time service.
This estimate is similar to the statistic that approximately ninety
percent of the time the panels rule unanimously, meaning that
dissents are found in fewer than one out of every ten cases.
Nevertheless, I believe that the complaint regarding panel
dependency may be symptomatic of broader ills, such as,
“indeterminacy” or “unpredictability.” If most of the time-seasoned
practitioners cannot predict the outcome of a given set of facts on an
issue such as equivalent infringement, then a serious problem arises.
In the areas of public contract, trade, or takings law, similar
assertions can be made. Most of the time-seasoned contract
practitioners should be able to agree, for example, that ambiguity in
the particular language of a contract is or is not “patent.” This
decision is normally an outcome-determinative choice. If it is highly
unpredictable, then many unfortunate consequences will flow in
contract cases just as in patent, trade, or other areas.
The central problem is that neither litigants nor litigators can
avoid, much less terminate, the litigation process because the
resulting indeterminacy will mean unpredictability. First, until a
panel of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decides the
case, no one can know the correct outcome, and the trial court result
will not be seen as acceptable. As a result, cases will be settled less
often before the institution of proceedings, (i.e., the filing of a
complaint). Second, between the filing of a complaint and the
commencement of the trial or significant pretrial evidentiary
hearings, such as those regarding proper claim construction in a
patent case, the incentive to settle the case usually will be insufficient.
Finally, the result on summary judgment, or even on mid-trial or post-
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trial judgment as a matter of law (“JMOL”), will not be accepted by
the losing party without appeal because the chances of reversal are
seen as at least fifty percent.
The least of many harms is that virtually no appeal will be
abandoned during pendency, but will be pressed to conclusion at the
Federal Circuit level. Once again, the party who loses the judgment
below can rationally form the conviction that the prospects of reversal
seem substantial, perhaps fifty percent or more. In actuality only
twenty percent to thirty percent of appeals result in reversals. But if
the prospects in a given appeal seem good, the litigator’s perception,
not what actually happens, governs. Moreover, even in cases where
the chance of reversal might fall within the range of twenty-five
percent to fifty percent, the large stakes typically attending cases in
areas such as patents, public contracts, takings, and international
trade will seem to justify the expense of time and money in seeing the
appellate process through to its conclusion. The odds are supported
by the fact that parties have already spent ninety percent or more of
the total cost of the litigation and, therefore, to spend another five
percent to ten percent to conclude the appeal process seems
justified.42
The aforementioned problem may be aggravated by the fact that a
significant number of outcome-determinative issues in major areas of
the court’s jurisdiction, such as patents, have been deemed issues of
law and, therefore, reviewable on appeal without deference to the
tribunal below. The term “de novo” is confusing. Because it is a court
of review, nothing the Federal Circuit does is truly “anew,” which I
take to be essentially the meaning of “de novo.” Sometimes this
nondeferential standard of review is referred to as “independent
review,” “free review,” or “simple review.” By whatever name, this
standard allows the Court of Appeals panel to substitute its own
judgment on an issue for that of the tribunal or court whose decision
or judgment the appellate court is reviewing. In general, the chances
of reversal are much higher on an issue subject to de novo review than
under any of the other deferential standards of review, such as “clear
error,” “abuse of discretion,” or “substantial evidence,” which
represent the most frequently applicable deferential standards of
review.
In the aforementioned patent and contract issues, the applicable
standard of review for claim construction and “latent” versus “patent”
42. The above figures are not based on empirical research, but are national figures, which
broadly illustrate the basic realities of appellate practice before the court. These figures are
estimates or impressions based on my tenure with the court that now exceeds 11 years.

1999]

FOREWORD

1193

ambiguity is de novo.43 Therefore, the unpredictability of the outcome
in such an appeal is even higher than with issues that are subject to
some degree of deference. In veterans’ cases, all questions are legal
questions and therefore subject to free review.44 In customs cases, the
ultimate question of the proper classification of an imported item
remains a question of law subject to independent review.45 Finally, in
subsidy and antidumping countervailing duty cases, the usual
governing standard of review involves deference.46
To understand the significance of the indeterminacy problem, one
must realize that in recent decades in the United States, only
approximately ten percent of the civil judgments or decisions have
been appealed. In patent cases, the percentage in recent times has
hovered at approximately fifty percent, perhaps due in part to the
large damage awards that typically are given. The question, however,
is whether the Federal Circuit, in its jurisdiction, will have the
capacity to hear any more than half of the cases that are brought to
conclusion in the trial courts. I argue that it clearly does not, nor will
it later acquire such capacity.
E. The Threat of Growing Delays
In general, the caseload of the federal appellate courts has
increased tenfold in the last thirty years or so, while the number of
judgeships has merely doubled.47 It is my belief that the Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit does not have much, if any, excess
capacity or the ability to decide more cases per year or to decide cases
43. See Cybor Corp. v. FAS Techs., Inc., 138 F.3d 1448, 1455, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169,
1174 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (citing the Supreme Court’s opinion in Markman v. Westview Instruments,
Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 388 (1996), in which the Court held that claim construction as a form of
“document construction” is solely a question of law subject to de novo review).
44. See Glenn L. Archer, Jr., Statement on Federal Circuit Jurisdiction, Address Before The
Twelfth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit (June 16, 1994), in 159 F.R.D. 59, 168 (1994) (explaining that judges are “limited to
reviewing the legal aspects of the Veterans Appeals’ decisions,” and not the facts); see also 38
U.S.C.A. § 7292 (1992 & Supp. 1999) (explaining the standard of review in veteran appeals
cases).
45. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516(f) (1994) (stipulating that the classification of imported items is
subject to final decision either by the Court of International Trade or the Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit).
46. See 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(1)(B) (establishing the system of judicial review in
countervailing duty and antidumping proceedings); see also Stephen J. Powell & Elizabeth C.
Seastrum, Straight Talk About a Complex Issue: The U.S. Standard of Judicial Review of Antidumping
and Countervailing Duty Determinations: An Important Challenge for N.A.F.T.A. Panels, 19 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 1451, 1455-63 (1996) (describing the use of reasonableness as a standard of review in
antidumping and countervailing duty cases).
47. TERENCE DANGWARTH & NICHOLAS M. PACE, STATISTICAL OVERVIEW OF CIVIL
LITIGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 30 (1990) (“The growth in the number of authorized
judgeships in the circuit courts over the last 40 years has lagged significantly behind increases in
the number of cases appealed.”).
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faster than at the present time. It is also unlikely that Congress will
expand significantly the resources of the federal appellate courts. If
these assumptions prove correct, then litigants face even greater
delays at the hands of the Federal Circuit, especially if the caseload
continues to rise and increase in complexity.
It is my view that the typical delays in important commercial cases
already exceed what is commercially tolerable. These delays clearly
account for the great increase in the popularity of every imaginable
form of so-called “alternative dispute resolution” (i.e., arbitration,
mediation, early neutral evaluation, etc.). I expect that this trend will
continue, in part, because the courts of appeals soon may be viewed
by the business community as intolerably slow.
1.

Indeterminacy and incapacity impede practitioners
The output of the Federal Circuit warrants further examination.
At any given time, it has pending approximately 1,000 cases. In a
given year, it normally disposes of over 900 cases. Out of these cases,
only about one third are patent cases. When one considers, however,
the number of legal issues facing the patent lawyers who work for
U.S. corporations, one quickly sees that potential lawsuits must
number at least in the tens of thousands.
A lawyer, whether employed as inside counsel or by a private law
firm, must conclude in an “opinion letter” whether a given device
infringes a certain patent and whether that patent is valid, and must
make judgments as to whether the patent may be enforced. In
addition, a lawyer must conclude whether the likely measure of
damages should be a reasonable royalty or the full award of all profits
deemed lost to the activity of the infringer. Even if each year only a
few thousand opinion letters are actually written, signed, and sent to
clients, that is ten times the number of opinions issued by the court.
The question then becomes how reliable are these attorney opinion
letters? If reliable ninety percent of the time, as measured by what
happens if the case is then litigated, then the system of patent law
administration in the United States can work fairly well. It would
mean that ninety percent of the potential litigation could be avoided
and the potential disputes settled between the parties through the
taking of a license, the exchange of cross licenses, the voluntary
payment of money, the exchange of assets, or other such creative
business arrangements. At the other extreme, if the reliability rate of
attorney opinion letters in patent cases is only ten percent, then,
logically, that would mean that ninety percent of the potential
disputes will result in the filing of a lawsuit, prosecution through final
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judgment, and an appeal prosecuted to conclusion as well.
In actuality, the accuracy rate of opinion letters by patent lawyers is
probably much closer to fifty percent. If one stipulates that it is
exactly fifty percent, then the question becomes whether the fifty
percent of the opinion that is accurate can be distinguished from the
fifty percent of the opinion that is inaccurate.48 This method is not as
determinative as litigation, of course. Therefore, the divergence
between a firm prediction and the eventual outcome, if actually
litigated, requires endless caveats and qualifications by practitioners
who feel compelled to include them in opinion letters.
2.

Business leaders feel trapped
Consider the position of a business executive in such a
circumstance. His own highly paid lawyers cannot tell him with
realistic probabilities, much less any kind of certainty, whether the
particular product infringes the patent in question. Therefore, the
business leader is unable to make secure judgments about what steps
he should take and faces compounded dangers. He faces not only
the unpredictability of the litigation process from the standpoint of
its ultimate outcome, but also from the standpoint of how long it will
take, how much it will cost, and how much disruption company
employees will suffer in the process of discovery, trial preparation,
and trial. Whether a given case from start to finish will take two, four,
six, or eight years is very difficult to assess. Similarly, whether it will
cost half a million, a million, two million, or four million dollars may
be equally hard to predict and depends on many variables. Such
variables include the judge in question, the number of cases on that
judge’s docket, the nature and complexity of the case, the number of
patents being asserted, the tactics of the opposition, the relative
strength of the companies, and many additional factors. The
essential reality for the business leader, however, is that he is facing a
process that can be enormously expensive, disruptive, entirely
uncontrollable, and unpredictable. Therefore, it is likely that as
business leaders become more aware of such risks and uncertainties,
they will insist on arbitration clauses, or other such contractual
provisions, in an attempt to avoid the risk of becoming victims of the
uncertainties of the U.S. litigation process.49
48. Note that the more the author feels uncertain about the outcome, the more the
prediction is hedged.
49. One may wonder whether many cases can be avoided through Alternative Dispute
Resolution (“ADR”), since often the prospective litigants are competitors of one another and as
business rivals, there may be no occasion for contractual agreement to avoid the litigation
process.
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3.

The doctrine of equivalents
The problem of indeterminacy cuts across all areas of the Federal
Circuit’s jurisdiction. It is probably worst in the patent area because
of considerable unpredictability in the application of the doctrine of
equivalents.50
The doctrine of equivalents imposes liability in circumstances
where the accused device or process is not covered by the issued
patent claims.51 Nevertheless, it infringes under what may be
considered “extended protection” pursuant to the judicially
established doctrine of equivalents. In patent law, this is the greatest
source of indeterminacy.
In recent decades, it has increasingly become the tactic of patent
litigators to charge equivalent infringement, as well as regular or
“literal” infringement. Now, virtually every patent case involves
equivalent infringement, as well as literal infringement, and nearly
always multiple grounds of alleged invalidity of the patents under
various statutory and judge-made rules. Consequently, every patent
case has a large number of issues, at least one of which is highly
unpredictable. The combination of multiple, difficult issues and the
doctrine of equivalents issue means that patent cases are affected
severely by the problem of indeterminacy.
Indeterminacy is
exacerbated because juries are increasingly relied upon to decide

Some judges express concern and displeasure with the ADR process. In my view, judges
should welcome it warmly because their capacity to handle more cases or their present caseload
faster, much less better, is so limited. With the increased expansion of business transactions,
population, dollar volumes, and the complexity of litigation, courts will need these alternative
systems in order to function more efficiently.
In most cases, ADR is a systemized way of doing what two good lawyers could do on their own
for their respective clients. If the courts provide a clearer set of rules with greater predictability
by which lawyers may assess the likely outcome of the case if litigated, they may agree privately
to a settlement soon after filing, if not before.
Some judges believe that an emphasis on rules as a means of greater predictability is
perverse. They argue that a higher level of justice, however defined, requires minimizing rules,
or at least having rules of maximum flexibility that one may call doctrines or principles as
opposed to rules of law. I expect that several judges not only on the Federal Circuit but on all
of its sister circuits largely subscribe to this view.
There is great satisfaction as a judge in being able to impose on parties what we perceive as
the most just outcome. The question in my mind, however, is whether this phenomenon is
another illustration of the general principle that sometimes the best is the enemy of the good.
In other words, by having optimum flexibility to attach a perfect result in a given case, we create
excess indeterminacy affecting numerous future cases.
50. The doctrine of equivalents protects the integrity of a patent from imitating products
that mimic the patented product except for one or more superfluous changes. See Graver Tank
& Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 (1950).
51. “[A] product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a
patent claim may nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the
elements of the accused product or process and the claimed elements of the patented
invention.” Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997).
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infringement questions.52
a.

Solutions to the doctrine of equivalents in case law

Possible solutions that would reduce the indeterminacy or
unpredictability of equivalent infringement rulings, in my opinion,
have been fully explored. For instance, numerous rules now exist to
rein in the more extreme applications of the doctrine. First, under
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, if the patent applicant
has surrendered certain subject matter to ease or to speed issuance of
a patent, that subject matter cannot later be recaptured and made
the subject of liability under the doctrine of equivalents.53 Second,
for more than a decade the doctrine of equivalents has been
restrained by the “all-elements” rule, sometimes referred to as the
“all-limitations” rule, from the Federal Circuit’s en banc case Pennwalt
v. Durand-Wayland Inc.,54 decided in 1987. The rule bars infringement
if even one limitation is not met, at least equivalently.55 The third
restraining doctrine was clarified and strengthened in the case of
Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Associates.56 This rule
holds that if the accused device or process is within the prior art or
can be characterized fairly as an obvious variation of the prior art,
then by definition it cannot equivalently infringe.57
Despite the extra boost to the “all-elements” rule and to
prosecution history estoppel from the unanimous Supreme Court
decision in Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemical Co.,58 the
52. Resorting to juries in patent cases has risen from about 10% when I came to the bar to
over 70% today.
53. See Augustine Med. v. Gaymar Indus., 181 F.3d 1291, 1298, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900,
1905 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“Prosecution history estoppel also limits undue expansion of a claim’s
scope through the doctrine of equivalents . . . . Specifically, prosecution history estoppel
prevents a patentee from recapturing subject matter surrendered during prosecution of the
patent.”) (citations omitted).
54. 833 F.2d 931, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 1987). In this case, the court held
that the district court correctly relied on an element-by-element comparison to determine that
there was no infringement under the doctrine of equivalents, because the accused device did
not perform the same functions as the Penwalt invention. See id. at 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1740.
55. See id. at 934, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739 (stating that with respect to each claim
limitation the patent owner must prove that the structure in the accused device “is the same as
or an equivalent of the structure disclosed in the specification”).
56. 904 F.2d 677, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
57. See id. at 683-84, 14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947-48 (explaining that “there can be no
infringement if the asserted scope of equivalency of what is literally claimed would encompass
the prior art”).
58. 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (adhering to the doctrine of equivalents as an objective inquiry
on an element-by-element basis). The Warner-Jenkinson Court went on to note that the doctrine
of prosecution history estoppel continues to be available as a defense to infringement. See id. at
30-33. If, however, the patentee shows that an amendment required during prosecution had an
unrelated purpose to patentability, a court must examine that purpose to determine whether
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various efforts to restrain the doctrine of equivalents and prevent its
undue applications have failed to resolve indeterminacy. The
aforementioned restraining doctrines now have had an adequate
chance to prove themselves.
b.

Legislative solutions to the doctrine of equivalents

One colleague on the court suggests that the solution to the
problems posed by the doctrine of equivalents, and indeed the only
sufficient solution, is legislative revision.59 Specifically, this colleague
believes that the doctrine of equivalents should be abrogated by
congressional enactment. The entire problem of unpredictability,
insofar as equivalent infringement is concerned, would be eliminated
if the doctrine were abolished by federal legislation.60
Analogs may exist, particularly in the area of public contract law,
where the sources of undue indeterminacy could be removed by
legislative fiat. To the extent this is so, however, the solution would
not reach a large percentage of the contract cases. In contract law,
trade law, and takings law, the outcomes tend to be driven more by
specific facts and evidence than by broad legal doctrines. Moreover,
the ubiquity of equivalent infringement charges in patent cases has
no analog in these other areas. In this area of patent law, the appeal
for a legislative cure is attractive enough to entice some to assume the
risk that Congress may make matters worse in an effort to make them
better.
F.

Appellate Settlement Office

With respect to the capacity of the court and whether it can be
expanded in the absence of the creation of additional judgeships,
one aspect of the problem not discussed above was highlighted
recently in a report issued by Senator Grassley as Chairman of the
Judiciary Subcommittee on the Administration of the Courts.61
Senator Grassley concluded that settlement programs should be
pursued as aggressively by the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit as they are by the majority of its sister circuits.62
Indeed, the subcommittee report suggested that before Congress
considers enlarging the number of judgeships for the Federal Circuit,
estoppel is precluded. See id. at 40-41.
59. This suggestion was made by Judge Alan D. Lourie.
60. To explore the pros and cons or take even a tentative position myself on this
recommendation is beyond the scope of this Essay.
61. STAFF OF SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 106TH CONG., REPORT ON THE ALLOCATION
OF JUDGESHIPS IN THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS (Comm. Print 1999).
62. See id. at 11.
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or even before it fills the one current vacancy, the court should first
create a settlement program.63
Ironically, the court budgeted for the position of a settlement
attorney years ago. The attorney was to be supported by a secretary
and one or two additional staff members to create a small,
independent office within the court structure. Although the judges
of the court conceived of the idea and framed the basic structure to
implement it, the court did not carry out this plan. With the increase
in litigation at the turn of the decade, the court decided in its
monthly administrative conference that its highest priority was to
provide a third law clerk per judge, the number of clerks all sister
circuit judges have enjoyed for many years. Thus, we redirected
funding toward this aim. For more than half a decade, Congress has
been asked to authorize and fund third law clerk positions as a line
item, and each year it has declined to do so. In response, the Federal
Circuit annually reprograms whatever funds are available, including
those designated for a settlement attorney’s office, in order to pay for
the third law clerk positions. If the predictions made above about the
low prospects of attaining significantly increased resources are
accurate, Congress will continue to deny additional funding for a
third law clerk, even though the positions are an absolute top priority
for the court.
What is the court forfeiting by not having a settlement attorney?64
With respect to its operational impact, I doubt that it is very
significant. Because the majority of cases that come before the court
tend to involve large sums of money and highly complicated issues of
business and technology, one has to question whether in the end the
litigators in these cases will be persuaded by a settlement attorney to
compromise and terminate the appeal in mid-course. I would
suggest that there is only a small percentage of cases in which such a
settlement might be attempted, and an even smaller percentage
where it would actually succeed. By crude estimate, I would calculate
that less than five percent of the over 900 appeals currently pending
could be terminated through settlement efforts, even if they were
conducted under ideal circumstances.
In addition, I doubt very much that the settlement program would
achieve major savings in personnel cases. Although the settlement
amounts may not be as impressive as trial judgments, to a middlelevel former government bureaucrat who might win $100,000 in the
63. See id. at 36.
64. Whether the court is forfeiting a chance to fill the twelfth judgeship is, of course, a
matter entirely within the purview of the Senate and not one on which I will comment.
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form of back pay for several years, the amounts seem like all the
money in the world. Moreover, that person frequently feels so
emotionally antagonized by his former supervisors, and the
government in general, that the litigation may be an exercise in
therapy. The lawsuit may be grounded in emotion rather than taking
into account the rather low prospects of prevailing. Therefore, it
seems that even an optimal settlement program would achieve
settlement in less than five percent of personnel cases.
After joining these two percentages together, I reason that the cost
of the program might be difficult to justify in terms of the 50-100
cases per year that it settles. Many of the cases subject to settlement
take very little time to adjudicate because of their simplicity.
Generally, the correct result is an affirmance, without doubt, and it
requires no extended study or analysis by the court. What is the gain
of settling a case if, to begin with, that case takes so little time?
Accordingly, I do not see much help for the court, or greater speed
or quality in its decisions for the benefit of the litigators and their
clients, as a potential by-product of a settlement program.
Certainly, if I alone were making the decisions within the court, I
would rather use the funding designated for the settlement office to
fund part of the third law clerk positions for each of the judges.
Dispensing with the third law clerk positions would greatly hinder the
court’s ability to issue opinions in an expedited manner. Because, as
suggested above, it already takes the Federal Circuit too long to
decide the average major case in the patent, trade, takings, contract,
and other major areas of the court’s jurisdiction, this additional delay
would be something I consider extremely undesirable and very
harmful to accomplishing the court’s congressionally assigned
mission.65
IV. PILOT REFORMS
If it is true, as I suggest, that Congress will not help much, am I
totally devoid of proposals as to how the court can solve its own
problems and thereby the problems of the litigators and litigants?
A. Per Curiam Opinions
I do have one suggestion, although one for which I can claim no
personal authorship or credit. It has been suggested to me by several
65. The court’s assigned mission is to ameliorate the “administration of the law in the areas
of patents, government contracts, merit system protection, trademarks, and international
trade.” 142 CONG. REC. S6155-01 (daily ed. June 12, 1996) (statement of Sen. Cohen).
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people, including a current member of the Supreme Court, that one
of the prime causes of inefficiency in appellate courts is the perceived
pressure to produce lengthy, learned, scholarly opinions, because
one has to sign one’s name as the author. Those opinions are in the
public domain and are the subject of extensive commentary and
criticism by legal journalists, general journalists, and law professors.
The suggestion here is that the identification of authorship results in
opinions being far longer than necessary—and taking much longer
than necessary to produce. If this analysis is correct, then a
significant portion, perhaps half of the delay in the average case,
could be attributed to this human factor of a signed opinion.
The solution is to have unsigned or per curiam opinions that tersely
declare the essential rationale agreed to by the three members of the
panel. The panel of course speaks for the court and its decisions are
binding on all future panels, unless and until, overruled by the court
sitting en banc.
Our court has some experience with shorter per curiam opinions
because they are typically used in non-precedential cases, particularly
simpler ones. My own view is that they are written with comparable
care and attention to both analysis and articulation as the longer
signed opinions. They are not, however, scholarly or otherwise
impressive examples to law professors or legal journalists. Therefore,
I would favor an experiment using the shorter, per curiam form as the
typical form of opinion in precedential cases. To date, it has been
used rarely in precedential cases. I contend that it could and should
be used, and that it certainly would justify a trial run or an
experiment that could be evaluated after a year or two.
B. Other Possible Pilot Practices
In addition to the court’s own experience, one can look to the
practices of foreign courts of comparable cultures, such as the former
British commonwealth countries. In comparison to the opinions
generated in these countries, one could conclude that a very large
percentage of Federal Circuit opinions in the more significant cases
are excessively long and complicated. The opinions often cover old
ground at great length and include a great many factual, legal, and
analytic comments that are not needed to explain to the parties why
their arguments were accepted or rejected, or to adequately guide
the conduct of lawyers and trial judges in similar future cases. In fact,
in many cases no formal appellate opinion is needed.66
66.

In such cases, the lower court’s opinion adequately explains the correct resolution of
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My own experience is limited to observing the courts in New
Zealand and sitting briefly in a purely honorary capacity with that
country’s highest court, the Court of Appeal. I was fascinated to see a
practice there that might ameliorate the inefficiency in the U.S.
courts of appeals. The practice involves the oral articulation of the
court’s reasoning. I observed several times, usually in relatively
simple cases, the use of an oral opinion from the bench. Typically at
the conclusion of the oral arguments in several cases, the court
recesses and meets in conference. After several hours, the court
reconvenes and one of its members states an opinion for the court,
usually referring to notes, but not reading verbatim. In some
countries where this practice is followed, the shorter oral opinion is
sometimes supplemented later by a more detailed written opinion.
The Federal Circuit could experiment with this process as well. The
process works better than one might imagine. As to authenticity and
credibility, it is unmistakable to everyone in the courtroom that this is
the judge speaking for the panel with utterly no input from law
clerks, central staff, or any other kind of judicial bureaucracy.
Second, the recital of the facts and arguments has the great virtue of
being entirely fresh, specific, vivid, and detailed. Often in written
opinions issued six months after argument, much of this sharpness is
lost. Needless to say, the delay in issuing opinions is reduced to
virtually zero, and the consequential inconvenience and frustration of
the parties are eliminated entirely. But note that this technique
would only suit, at most, one-third of the caseload. In the majority of
appeals, the issues and authorities are too complicated for an oral
opinion from the bench.
CONCLUSION: A DIALOGUE WITH THE BAR
One purpose of mentioning these proposals in this Essay is to
invite the opinions and suggestions of the various bars that practice
before the court. If no one cares to voice an opinion, the silence
shall speak for itself. If there are strong objections, the court could
examine their merits. If an idea was supported broadly, then maybe
it could be implemented across the board. At the very least, one
would think that proceeding on an experimental basis would be an
entirely safe thing to do in that circumstance.
Now, one must ask whether the Federal Circuit’s problems are so
severe as to warrant such revolutionary measures. They are, to some
extent, radical in the eye of the beholder. From the informal
the issues raised on appeal.
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exchanges and questions asked during my regular presentations to
specialized bar groups across the country, I have developed a strong
sense that litigators, as well as a very large portion of the client base,
consider the status quo to be significantly unsatisfactory. I am also
sensitive to criticism that appears in academic commentary and in
analyses done by experts that raise serious questions about whether
the U.S. system of civil justice is not unduly slow, disruptive,
expensive, and unnecessarily unpredictable. Indeed, I share their
conclusion that our civil justice system is, at times, just that.
Therefore, if I have a bias, it is that the current practices are
significantly unsatisfactory, and, therefore, major reforms should be
considered and tried, at least on a pilot basis. I admit this view up
front so that my suggestions may be evaluated according to their
source.
The final reason for airing such views in this introductory Essay to
this special Federal Circuit Issue of the American University Law Review
is to ascertain to what extent others care about these problems, and
whether the “consumers” of the court’s product are supportive of
efforts to improve the appellate process pursuant to the
aforementioned suggestions. Therefore, I encourage anyone who
reads this Essay to respond to me, to the Chief Judge, or to the
editors of the American University Law Review.

